Scott Straus uses a
multi-method approach to examine one of the thorniest questions in political
violence: the causes and mechanisms of genocide. His extremely well-written,
methodologically ground-breaking, but nevertheless enormously difficult book
takes an embedded single case study approach to the 1994 Rwanda genocide,
looking at the determinants that created the genocide, and the determinants
that led the perpetrators to participate in the genocide. Straus argues that the same
root causes drive genocide, at least in Rwanda, both at the macro and micro
levels. Specifically, he argues that fear of the consequences of failing to act
drives participation, finding that the behavior of Hutu hardliners in Rwanda
support the notion that they feared a loss of power, and potentially a loss of
control. He also finds that individual perpetrators usually participated in
killing out of fear of retribution if they did not participate, although he
does find that more conventional explanations of the perpetrators’
participation explains the degree to which they participated.
There’s very little to
criticize in this book; Straus acknowledges the limitations of his methods,
which primarily fall into the arena of having data whose reliability can be
questioned. He doesn’t overreach in his conclusions (except, I think, in
undervaluing the role of history, and in undervaluing the comparative value of
his study). And he spends a significant amount of time triangulating his data to
ensure its reliability to the extent that he can. This may make the book sound
repetitive, but leaves its conclusions unquestioned.
My take: I am concerned that Straus
does not evaluate the role of history in driving the hardliners’ fear. After
the Kayibanda regime and its successors were overthrown by Habyarimana’s coup,
a significant portion of the prior regime’s elites were summarily executed.
Granting the influence of the other factors Straus finds (the death of
Habyarimana, the resumption of war, the government’s failure to defeat the
RPF), did the memory of what they had
done to Kayibanda’s followers help to drive the hardliners’ belief that it was
kill or be killed? This would further support Straus’ thesis, since it would
reinforce the parallels between individual perpetrators and the elite
hardliners. The failure to explore that factor is a shortcoming, but I
acknowledge that Straus may not have been able to reasonably acquire that data.
My other methodological
critique lies in Straus’ deference to the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda. Even where his own findings dispute the Tribunal’s, he asserts without
any support the factual findings of the Tribunal.[1] While
this deference is understandable, as Straus no doubt does not want to undermine
the Tribunal’s efforts at bringing those responsible to justice, his later
criticism of the RPF regime’s “maximal justice” approach rings hollow when
compared with his unflinching support for the ICTR.
I am also deeply concerned by “banality
of evil” approaches to genocide perpetrators, because the implications for
modern developed democracies are troubling, particularly in light of arguments
like William Rehnquist’s that the majority has the right to determine the
minority’s rights absent a clear command to the contrary from a constitutive
document. I saw parallels between Rwanda’s capacity to compel compliance and
the growing heavy hand of American policing, and parallels between the Rwandan
political culture and American knee-jerk support for state suppression of
minorities. As a religious minority that has been subject to discrimination,
oppression, and violence in the United States, I wonder if there are parallels
to the fear of the Hutu hardliners in American political life, and wonder what
American political institutions might do in the face of a state policy to
commit genocide.
Finally, I wondered about
negative cases for Straus’ model. I’m not sure that that’s a fruitful approach,
given the question of how one defines a genocide that didn’t happen. But
comparing Rwanda’s 1994 genocide to the transition away from apartheid in South
Africa could prove fruitful.
[1]
See, e.g., the passage where he discusses the role radio broadcasts played in
driving the genocide (p. 231).